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1. Introduction 
Air pollution has become a serious environmental issue after over three decades of unprecedented economic growth 
in China. The heavy reliance on an energy- and pollution-intensive development path has led to a steep increase in 
emissions (Schreifels et al., 2012). For example, in 1998 SO2 emissions caused acid rain to cover 30% of China 
(Ministry of Ecology and Environment of China, 1998), and in 2006 acid rain accounted for 49% of total rainfall 
nationwide and almost 100% of total rainfall in 19 provinces and cities in 2006 (Meteorological Administration of 
China, 2007). Heavy air pollutants can result in residential health problems including cardiorespiratory diseases 
(Ebenstein et al., 2015), premature deaths (Lelieveld et al., 2015; Rohde and Muller, 2015), and reduction of life 
expectancy (Chen et al., 2013; Ebenstein et al., 2017). 
After increased government reaction (Chen et al., 2013), Chinese SO2 emissions peaked in 2006 (2.59 trillion tons 
of SO2) and experienced a dramatic reduction afterwards (Gao, Li and Chen, 2016). In order to mitigate the heavy 
air pollution in China, the State Council proposed a reduction of 10% of total pollutant emissions in its 11th Five 
Year Plan in 2006 (State Council, 2006), which is one of the most important administrative tools in China. Starting 
from 2006, environmental performance has been gradually integrated into the accountability for local political 
leaders (Pu and Fu, 2018). In 2011, the State Council announced the National 12th Five-Year Plan for Environmental 
Protection (State Council, 2011), which for the first time explicitly incorporates environmental protection into the 
performance assessments of local government officials at all levels and implements a veto system for environmental 
protection. China also issued the Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Air Pollution in September 2013 
(State Council, 2013), announcing that the concentration of respirable particulate matter in all prefectures will drop 
by more than 10% compared with 2012 by 2017. 
The causes of severe air pollution and its mitigation afterwards are closely related to political administration and the 
role of political elites (Bernauer and Koubi, 2009), especially in developing and transitional economies (Zheng et 
al., 2014; Dincer and Fredriksson, 2018; Hong and Teh, 2019). Behind the high pollution process and mitigation 
efforts in China, an interesting and unique phenomenon of political connections known as “Guanxi” (Shih, Adolph, 
and Liu, 2012; Opper, Nee, and Brehm, 2015; Jiang, 2018) attracts our attention. It helps explain the causes of both 
industrial pollution and subsequent mitigation efforts beyond the conventional approaches that focus on economic 
and technological factors (Arvesen and Hertwich, 2011; Xu, Williams and Socolow, 2009). 
2 
 
Personal connections of political elites, especially the patron–client relations between local and upper-level officials, 
constitute an integral part of the political system (Jiang, 2018). These connections profoundly impact local air 
pollution and environmental performance for several reasons. First, personal connections can provide lower-level 
officials with resources and protection from higher-level officials (Scott, 1972; Jia, 2017), which are often related to 
more economic production and therefore more pollution. Second, patron–client relations may act as an informal tool 
to align the interests and coordinate the actions of central and local officials (Jiang, 2018), which encourages 
pollution when economic growth is the first priority and stringent pollution mitigation when environmental 
protection is included in political performance assessment. Third, patron–client relations can breed corruption 
through lobbying or bribes (Rose-Ackerman, 1999), which can intensify air pollution through more lax 
environmental regulation (Wilson and Damania, 2005; Biswas et al., 2012; Candau and Dienesch, 2016; Arminen 
and Menegaki, 2019; Zhou, Wang, and Chen, 2020) and political protection (Fredriksson and Neumayer, 2014). In 
contrast to Western electoral politics, in which local political leaders are mainly responsible to their voters, Chinese 
local officials generated through so-called selectoral politics are instead responsible to both citizens under their 
governance and upper-level political leaders, highlighting the importance of patronage connections and underlining 
their impacts. 
This study investigates how political patronage connections shape local air pollution in China. The analysis is based 
on evidence from China because China has not only witnessed serious environmental issues and mitigation efforts 
but also has pervasive political patronage connections (Jiang, 2018). The research is based on a uniquely detailed 
data set at the pollutant–firm–city–year level, in which each city is paired to a party secretary and a mayor. The party 
secretary refers to the Secretary of the Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China, the city’s first-in-
command, who has political and administrative authority in policy and managerial decisions at the municipal level. 
The city mayor is the head of the executive branch of a city and has the responsibility of presiding over the municipal 
government; the mayor’s political status is below that of the city secretary. The results show that local officials who 
have personal ties to the leader of a province tend to have more SO2 intensive enterprises under their governance. 
This claim is further substantiated by using both quasi-difference-in-differences (DID) analysis and the instrumental 
variable (IV) method in order to identify the causal relationship between political connections and pollution. We 
then conduct additional robustness tests on several other pollutants, as well as heterogeneity tests for different 
ownership and firm sizes. We find that compared with foreign-owned firms, the environmental performance of 
domestically owned firms are more likely to be affected by these patron–client relations. We also conduct a number 
of extension analyses to corroborate the main findings and to investigate the mechanisms, including reasons for 
appointment of local leaders to a given city (i.e., to cities with favorable conditions as a reward or to polluting cities 
as a test of ability), career incentives, and pollution caused by corruption. The findings of this study highlight the 
importance of informal institutions for environmental management and pollution mitigation. 
This study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, this paper contributes to a growing literature on the 
political economy of the environment. By focusing on the personal connections between political elites, this study 
provides a better understanding of how informal political institutions affect environmental conditions and reveals 
the politics underlying Chinese environmental policies. Second, this study contributes to the vast literature on the 
relationship between career incentives for politicians and government performance. Our results show that patterns 
in promotion criteria have changed from sacrificing the environment in the name of economic growth to building a 
greener economy. It is worth noting that local officials with personal connections have responded to changes in 
targets even more actively than those without. Patronage connections may help local officials to better “stand in their 
boss’s shoes” and act in a more compliant way. Personal connections between higher- and lower-level officials can 
“grease the wheels” and help align the targets of different levels of governments. Third, this study is based on a large 
unique data set that consists of disaggregated enterprise-level pollution data and paired political elite information, 
which allows us to identify the causality between political connections and environmental performance, and 
investigates several mechanisms underlying environmental performance. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the previous literature. Section 3 details the 
data used in the analysis. In section 4, we outline the empirical strategy, discuss the main results, identify the causal 
relationships, and conduct robustness checks and heterogeneity tests. In section 5, we conduct a number of extension 
analyses to investigate the mechanisms behind Chinese pollution governance and environmental conditions, 
including resource mechanisms, career incentives, and pollution resulting from corruption. Section 6 offers the 
conclusions and implications for future policy. 
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2. Literature Review 
Environmental issues have attracted a great deal of attention from academics, creating a growing body of literature 
on the political economy of the environment (Thomas, Timmons, and JoAnn, 2011). In particular, political 
connections and environmental pollution has become an emerging topic of significance (Jia, 2017). Here, we review 
two topics of literature: the political economy of pollution and the patronage connections between politicians. 
2.1The Political Economy of Pollutions 
The major focus of this study is the political economy of pollution (List and Sturm, 2006; Robin et al., 2012; Kahn, 
Li, and Zhao, 2015; Lipscomb and Mobarak, 2017; Jia, 2017; He, Wang, and Zhang, 2020). As a result of 
investigations of the political economy of connections by economists (Krueger, 1974), political connections have 
been viewed as both a “helping hand” that brings additional resources to enterprises and a “grabbing hand” that 
forces firms to overinvest in high-pollution industries to ensure economic growth, both of which result in 
overinvestment and increased pollution (An et al., 2016; Ling et al., 2016; Pan and Tian, 2020; Yu et al., 2020). 
A major focus of recent studies has been efforts to explain how pollution issues and environmental problems are 
addressed from the perspective of career incentives (Cao, Kleit, and Liu, 2016), that is, the pollution-promotion 
question (Wu and Cao, 2021). There has been extensive evidence of pollution for economic development and 
political promotion incentive (Jia, 2017; Wu and Chen, 2016; Cao et al., 2016; Pu and Fu, 2018; Wu and Cao, 2021). 
Since the fiscal decentralization of the 1990s, local politicians have been granted strong power as agents of the 
central government (Zhang and Zou, 1998) to prioritize the local economy and deliver high economic growth targets 
in exchange for promotion, even at extremely high environmental cost (Maskin et al., 1997; Li and Zhou, 2005; 
Zheng et al., 2014; Yu et al., 2020; Wu and Cao, 2021). Jia (2017) finds that government officials seek to maximize 
the possibility of their promotion at the expense of the environment by investing more in high-pollution enterprises 
to promote economic growth, known as “pollute for promotion”. Feng et al. (2018) find that environmental 
performance did not significantly impact political turnover of municipal party secretaries during the period 2002-
2013. A few studies have looked at local pollution abatement performance after the central government began 
including environmental performance into the promotion criteria (State Council, 2006; Pu and Fu, 2018). Zheng et 
al. (2014), finding that better performance on air pollution treatment spending and air pollution control is associated 
with a higher chance of city mayor promotion. Pu and Fu (2018) show that pollution decreases the chances of 
promotion for city mayors, affirming that better pollution treatment has a positive effect on promotion. Wang and 
Lei (2020) also find that efforts toward environmental protection have a positive return on the careers of local 
officials. Wu and Cao (2021) find that local officials who are better at reducing air pollution are more likely to be 
promoted at the county level, although they do not find a pollution–promotion link at the prefectural or provincial 
levels. 
Another focus of studies on the political economy of pollution is on providing a better understanding of the 
relationship between political connections, corruption, and relevant pollution outcomes (Candau and Dienesch, 
2017). On one hand, it has been widely accepted that political connections are highly relevant to private returns and 
corruption (Fisman et al., 2014; Lehne, Shapiro, and Eynde, 2018). A growing number of papers have documented 
how political connections bring benefits to firms, households, and individuals (Amore and Bennedsen, 2013; Lehne, 
Shapiro, and Eynde, 2018). On the other hand, it has been documented that political corruption can increase pollution 
intensity (Lopez and Mitra, 2000), decrease ecological efficiency (Wang et al., 2020), and harm the environment 
(Lopez and Mitra, 2000; Fredriksson, List and Millimet, 2003; Biswas et al., 2012; Candau and Dienesch, 2017). 
Corruption can affect pollution through political protection realized through bribing or lobbying government officials 
(Fredriksson and Neumayer, 2014) or by obtaining lax environmental regulations (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Biswas 
et al., 2012; Cao et al., 2019; Hong and Teh, 2019), which all increase local pollution levels and contribute to the so-
called pollution haven effect (Copeland and Taylor, 1994; Dean, Lovely, and Wang, 2009). Chen et al. (2018) find 
that corruption behavior can weaken environmental regulations and exacerbate pollution. Zhou, Wang, and Chen 
(2020) use the anti-corruption campaign in China begun in 2013 as an exogenous shock, finding that the anti-
corruption campaign has reduced air pollution in China by 20.3% through the more stringent environmental 
regulations that were subsequently introduced. 
2.2 Patronage Connections between Politicians 
Patronage connections, that is, the hierarchical ties of reciprocal benefits between politicians, have long been an 
essential yet informal part of political systems (Scott, 1972). In a patronage connection, higher-level officials or 
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patrons provide personal endorsement for promotions or protection, and lower-level officials or clients respond to 
the demands and interests of their patrons (Jiang, 2018). Patronage connections function as an informal institution 
regulating interactions among political elites. Many studies have emphasized the favoritism channel of patronage 
connections (Fisman, 2014; Shih, 2004; Khwaja and Mian 2005; Opper and Brehm 2007; Shih, Adoplh, and Liu, 
2012) or discussed its negative influence on government ability (Geddes, 1994; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Stokes, 2005). 
The Chinese bureaucracy is characterized by a personalized authority that highlights the importance of personal 
relationships (Pye, 1995). It has been widely recognized that political patronage connections are essential in the 
Chinese political context, which has been shown by both anecdotal evidence and systematic empirical analysis (Shih, 
Adolph, and Liu, 2012; Jia, Kudamatsu, and Seim, 2015). Within the Chinese context, local officials are appointed 
by upper-level officials (He, 2015) who play a major role in personnel control within the area under their governance 
(Maskin et al., 1997; Yu, Cai, and Gao, 2016). Within the Chinese context, previous studies have emphasized the 
importance of patronage connections in the appointment, promotion and rotation (Opper, Nee, and Brehm, 2015; 
Wu and Chen, 2016), resource allocations (Shih, 2004, 2008; Yu, Yao, Zheng, and Zhang, 2020), and alignment of 
interests and targets of different levels of government (Jiang, 2018). 
3. Data and Method 
3.1Data 
This study employs a uniquely detailed data set comprising Chinese enterprise pollution and political elites patronage 
data at the firm, city, and year levels from 1998 to 2012. The analysis is conducted based on data from three sources: 
the firm-level Chinese Industrial Enterprise Dataset (CIED), covering 1998 to 2012; the Chinese Industrial Enterprise 
Pollution Dataset (CIEPD), covering 1998 to 2012; and the Chinese Political Elite Database (CPED), covering late 
1990s to 2015. 
The CIED covers all enterprises with annual sales greater than 5 million RMB from 1998 to 2012, including both 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs. Each firm is identified by a 10-digit code, in which the first 4 digits 
represent the firm location, namely, the province and prefecture where it is located. The data set comprises annual 
survey data on enterprises’ basic information, production status, and financial information drawn from the balance 
sheets, profit and loss statements, and cash flow statements. Specifically, it includes variables for firm location, 
industrial activities and sectors, gross output, value added, sales, and total labor input. 
The CIEPD provides survey-based information on pollution, emissions, and the environmental management of 
Chinese industrial enterprises from 1998 to 2012. This data set includes information on enterprises’ basic information, 
indicators on its air, water, and solid waste generation, reduction and emissions, and adoption of pollution control 
measures. It provides disaggregated data for the study of environmental governance and industrial pollution in China. 
In this study, pollution intensity is measured by the emissions of pollutant per unit of output. 
The CPED has provided biographical data of over 4000 Chinese municipal, provincial, and national leaders in China 
since the late 1990s, including detailed information on their education history and career path (Jiang, 2018). The 
CPED data set was used to construct a city–year-level panel data set, focusing on whether the city secretary or the 
mayor is connected to higher-level leaders, namely, province secretaries in this study. The CPED data set deduces 
patron–client relations from past promotions and provides an accurate measure of political patronage connections. 
This study first matches the CIED with the CIEPD using both the enterprise identifier and the name of firms 
following the method developed by Brandt, Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2014) and Feenstra, Li, and Yu (2014). We 
then match each enterprise with relevant city political elites using the city administration code and the survey year. 
Next, we can use panel data with firm–city–year data for individuals using 290,170 observations from 1999 to 2012 
(when SO2 is used as the independent variable), each including a city secretary and a mayor. This dataset is highly 
representative of China as it covers as much as 50% of China’s SO2 emissions and 50% of total output in all of 
China’s industrial enterprises. The summary statistics of the main variables used in this study are reported in Table 
1. Figure 1 provides the county-level geography distribution of SO2 pollution and political connections in 2007, 




    
(a)                           (b) 
Figure 1: SO2 Pollution and Political Connections in 2007 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 Domestic Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan Foreign 
 Mean SD N mean sd N Mean SD N 
Panel A: Pollution Data 
lnSO2 1.99 2.14 242859 0.87 2.46 24581 0.24 2.77 22730 
lnCOD 0.58 2.55 158740 0.16 2.32 18932 -0.33 2.32 17390 
ln Ammonia Nitrogen -2.00 2.68 68586 -2.52 2.45 11099 -3.07 2.53 9939 
lnGas 0.00 2.12 227207 -0.89 2.10 21972 -1.14 2.15 20145 
lnDust 1.29 2.26 195271 -0.05 2.45 17805 -0.32 2.60 16196 
Panel B: Firm Production Data 
lnOutput 7.98 1.62 242859 8.64 1.66 24581 9.09 1.76 22730 
lnEmployee 5.50 1.18 242859 5.73 1.11 24581 5.80 1.15 22730 
open 15.06 14.69 242859 9.47 6.22 24581 9.05 6.26 22730 
New 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 0.05 0.22 242859 0.03 0.17 24581 0.03 0.18 22730 
Export (%) 0.07 0.20 242859 0.33 0.41 24581 0.32 0.39 22730 
Panel C: Political Elites 
mayor 0.47 0.50 242859 0.40 0.49 24581 0.40 0.49 22730 
secretary 0.43 0.49 242859 0.37 0.48 24581 0.37 0.48 22730 
secretaryormayor 0.55 0.50 242859 0.48 0.50 24581 0.49 0.50 22730 
Note: The variable 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚 refers to the mayor’s connection to the provincial party secretary, the variable 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 
refers to the city party secretary’s connection to the provincial party secretary, and the variable 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚 
refers to the mayor or city party secretary’s connection to the provincial party secretary. These three variables take 
the value 1 if a patronage connection exists, and 0 otherwise. 
3.2 Empirical Strategy 
This section outlines the empirical strategy. This study compares the intensity of SO2 emissions in the presence and 
absence of political connections of city party secretaries and mayors to higher-level governors. Firm-level data on 
SO2 intensity are used as an indicator of pollutant level in baseline regressions for the following considerations. SO2 
is an important pollutant in the atmosphere and is colorless and toxic, with an irritating odor. SO2 can easily enter 
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the human body and pose a threat to human health. In addition to being toxic to humans, SO2 can also interact with 
water vapor and oxygen in the atmosphere to produce sulfuric acid, which can turn into acid rain. SO2 can also form 
aerosol particles in complex ways and has been found to be a major contributors to PM2.5 and haze problems in 
China. China used to be the world’s largest SO2 emitter. SO2 is one of the most harmful pollutants associated with 
China’s rapid growth of the early 2000s. This study also uses as other indicators a range of metrics and pollutants, 
including chemical oxygen demand (COD), ammonia nitrogen, waste gas, and industrial dust, in following 
robustness analysis. 
The baseline specification is as follows: 
ln𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , the dependent variable, indicates the logarithm of the pollutant intensity, which is measured by the 
amount of SO2 emissions per unit of total output of firm 𝑖𝑖 in city 𝑗𝑗, industry 𝑘𝑘 and year 𝑠𝑠. The main explanary 
variable 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  indicates whether or not the municipal secretary or the mayor of city 𝑗𝑗 in year 𝑠𝑠 is connected to the 
provincial secretary, which is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if a patronage connection is found and 0 otherwise. 
In specific, 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  includes 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚, 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚, and 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a series of control variables, including 
the logarithm of the total outputs of the enterprise, the share of intermediate inputs in total outputs, the logarithm of 
total employees, years of operation, the share of exported sales in total sales. The baseline regression also controls 
for fixed effects, where 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖  is the city fixed effect controlling for all time-invariant differences between cities, 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 is 
the industry fixed effect controlling for all time-invariant differences between industries, and 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 is the year fixed 
effect controlling for time-variant changes that affect all cities and industries simultaneously. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents the 
standard error term. 
4. Empirical Results 
This section presents the main results. First, we measure the impact of a city secretary or mayor having political 
connections to higher levels on enterprises’ pollution intensity in the relevant cities. We then identify the causal 
relationship between enterprise pollution and political connections using the interaction with political connection 
and newly built firms. Third, we conduct robustness tests using a range of metrics and pollutants, including COD, 
ammonia nitrogen, waste gas, and industrial dust. Finally, heterogeneity tests are conducted for different ownership 
subsamples and different enterprise sizes. 
4.1Baseline Analysis 
We first conduct a baseline analysis to investigate whether political elites with connections to higher-level leaders 
would allow for more pollutant enterprises in cities under their governance. Table 2 presents the baseline results on 
the effect of political connections on enterprise SO2 intensity. Regressions include city, industry, and year fixed 
effects in columns 1, 2, and 3 of Table 2, and city, industry–year, and year fixed effects in columns 4, 5, and 6. 
The results show a positive effect of presence of a political connection on the SO2 intensity in relevant cities. 
Columns 1 and 4 show that if the city mayor is connected to the provincial governor, the SO2 intensity could increase 
by 1.97% or 2.35% depending on the set of fixed effects. Columns 2 and 5 show that if the city secretary is connected 
to the provincial governor, the SO2 intensity could increase by 1.69% or 1.77%. Columns 3 and 6 show that if either 
the city mayor or the secretary is connected to the provincial governor, the SO2 intensity could increase by 2.53% 
or 2.88%. Table 2 also shows that larger enterprises with greater output tend to be cleaner in terms of SO2 intensity. 
With a 1% increase in the gross output of the enterprise, SO2 intensity will decrease by about 0.6%. However, 
enterprises with more employees tend to pollute more, which implies that pollutive industries are usually labor 
intensive as well, for instance the coal and mining industry, metal industry, and cement production industry. 
Enterprises that have been operating for longer also tend to pollute more. With an additional year after opening, SO2 
intensity increases by about 0.2%. There are many possible reasons for this, examples being older firms often belong 
to manufacturing industries that are generally more polluting, and they may rely on out-of-date technology and 
equipment. One interesting finding is that exporting firms have not been found to pollute more, which might speak 




Table 2: SO2 Intensity and Political Connections 
 lnSO2 lnSO2 lnSO2 lnSO2 lnSO2 lnSO2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
mayor 0.0197***   0.0235***   
 (0.0071)   (0.0071)   
secretary  0.0169**   0.0177**  
  (0.0072)   (0.0073)  
secretaryormayor   0.0253***   0.0288*** 
   (0.0071)   (0.0072) 
InOutput -0.6243*** -0.6243*** -0.6431*** -0.6213*** -0.6213*** -0.6395*** 
 (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0030) 
InEmployee 0.3516*** 0.3516*** 0.3661*** 0.3496*** 0.3496*** 0.3635*** 
 (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0043) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0043) 
open 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0024*** 0.0016*** 0.0017*** 0.0021*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
export -0.7283*** -0.7282*** -0.7067*** -0.7076*** -0.7076*** -0.6815*** 
 (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0134) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0134) 
cons 4.1116*** 4.1107*** 3.0182*** 4.4522*** 4.4510*** 3.3863*** 
 
(0.0493) (0.0493) (0.0488) (0.0928) (0.0928) (0.0990) 
City Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes    
Y ear Yes Yes Yes    
Industry x Year    Yes Yes Yes 
N 291394 291394 332286 291394 291394 332286 
adj.R2 0.471 0.471 0.475 0.475 0.475 0.479 
Note: Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. Standard error is 
presented in parentheses. Regressions include city, industry, and year fixed effects in columns 1, 2, and 3, and city, 
industry–year, and year fixed effects in columns 4, 5, and 6. 
4.2 Causal Relationship Identification 
To deal with the potential endogeneity of political connections, this study attempts to identify the causal relationship 
between pollution behavior and political connections. The endogeneity of political connections could be because of 
several reasons. First, politically connected city secretaries and mayors might receive more resources or policy favors 
(Jia, 2017; Jiang, 2018) and be assigned to more productive cities with more long-established polluting enterprises. 
Second, highly polluting firms might seek government protection, in terms of building political connections for their 
city secretaries and mayors, or influence the appointment of local officials. That is, there can be a reverse causality 
from intensive pollution to patronage connections of political elites. 
To identify the causal relationship, this study first employs a quasi-DID approach using interactions between a 
dummy for political connection and a dummy for newly opened enterprises to identify whether enterprises newly 
opened when the city secretary or city mayor is connected to higher-level political governors are more pollutive than 
those newly opened when there are no such connections. Newly opened enterprises are defined as firms starting 
operation in each survey year. For instance, for survey wave 2003, enterprises starting operations during 2003 are 
defined as newly opened. IT should be noted that this could underestimate the number of new firms, since firms that 
opened in late 2002 have also been in operation for less than one year. However, information about the month when 
the survey is conducted was unavailable. 
Table 3 presents statistical evidence for the causal effect between political connections and higher enterprise SO2 
intensity. The coefficients for the city mayor’s connections, city secretary’s connections, and both city mayor or 
secretary’s connections are still positive and significant. Personal connections of the city mayor, city secretary, or 
either of them to higher-level governors increases the enterprise SO2 intensity by 2.27%, 1.70%, and 2.77%, 
respectively, as shown in columns 4, 5, and 6 of Table 3. The coefficient for the dummy of newly-started firms is 
positive but not significant, showing that the SO2 intensity is balanced between newly started firms and previously 
established firms. The main focus of this study is the interaction term between the political connection and the newly 
started dummy. The positive coefficients show that enterprises that are newly started when there are higher-level 
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political connections are more SO2-intensive than those that are not. The results in columns 3 and 6 show that when 
the either the city mayor or the city secretary is connected to the provincial governor, the SO2 intensity of newly 
started firms in the city could be 11.75% more intensive than firms that are newly started when there are no such 
connections. It is worth noting that the results in Table 3 do not rule out the possibility that political elites with 
connections might be assigned to more productive, resourceful, and polluting cities. In actuality, the results in Table 
3 show that previously established enterprises are still more polluting in cities with personal connections of political 
elites than those without. This suggests that political elites are indeed assigned to more pollutive regions. Table 3 
also provides causal evidence for another reason behind the high pollution in some cities, namely, that city mayors 
and secretaries with political connections allow more polluting firms to begin operations during their terms. The 
findings show that political connections increase pollution even after controlling for the start time of the firms. 
Table 3: Causal Relationship Identification by Quasi-DID 
 lnSO2 lnSO2 lnSO2 lnSO2 lnSO2 lnSO2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
mayor 0.0192***   0.0227***   
 (0.0071)   (0.0071)   
secretary  0.0163**   0.0170**  
  (0.0073)   (0.0073)  
secretaryormayor   0.0245***   0.0277*** 
   (0.0071)   (0.0072) 
new 0.0354 0.0553 0.0060 0.0322 0.0537 0.0068 
 
(0.0401) (0.0364) (0.0388) (0.0401) (0.0363) (0.0387) 
mayor x new 0.0762   0.0821   
 (0.0547)   (0.0545)   
secretary x new  0.0434   0.0464  
  (0.0550)   (0.0548)  
secretaryormayor x new   0.1175**   0.1211** 
   (0.0524)   (0.0522) 
InOutput -0.6253*** -0.6253*** -0.6448*** -0.6222*** -0.6222*** -0.6410*** 
 (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0030) 
InEmployee 0.3593*** 0.3594*** 0.3767*** 0.3565*** 0.3566*** 0.3730*** 
 (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0042) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0042) 
Export -0.7332*** -0.7332*** -0.7151*** -0.7117*** -0.7117*** -0.6885*** 
 (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0134) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0134) 
cons 4.1248*** 4.1237*** 3.0516*** 4.4598*** 4.4583*** 3.4006*** 
 
(0.0492) (0.0492) (0.0488) (0.0925) (0.0925) (0.0976) 
City Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes    
Year Yes Yes Yes    
Industry x Year    Yes Yes Yes 
N 292110 292110 333309 292110 292110 333309 
adj.R2 0.471 0.471 0.475 0.475 0.475 0.480 
Note: Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. Standard error is presented in parentheses. Regressions 
include city, industry, and year fixed effects in columns 1, 2, and 3, and city, industry–year, and year fixed effects in columns 4, 5, and 6. 
For causality identification, this study also uses an IV approach to address the endogeneity of political connections. 
We use the tenure of the current provincial secretary as an instrument variable for political connections. For instance, 
if the provincial secretary took office in 2004, the number of years since their appointment as of the year 2006 would 
be 2. When a new provincial secretary is appointed, only a few city officials are able to establish connections. As 
provincial secretaries promote new city officials and cultivate their own networks later on, the number of patron–
client connections grows steadily throughout their tenure (Jiang, 2018). As the period since a provincial secretary’s 
appointment increases, it becomes more likely that city level officials will be connected to them. In China, there is 
frequent turnover of cadres at the provincial level (Huang, 2002; Jiang, 2018). In addition to promotion and 
termination leading to new provincial secretaries, the rotation of officials among equally ranked positions serves as 
another important method of turnover (Wu and Chen, 2016). Figure 2 shows that the number of connections between 
city secretaries or mayors and the provincial secretary increases along with the provincial secretary’s tenure. 
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(a)        (b) 
Figure 2: Number of Political Connections and the Tenure of Provincial Party Secretary 
In the following regression, this study uses the number of years since the current provincial secretary’s appointment 
as an instrument variable for the 2SLS estimation, with the results presented in Table 4. The first-stage F-statistic 
for the IV satisfies the rule of thumb (which is more than 10), indicating that there is no weak IV problem. The IV 
estimates show that having patronage connections results in a significant increase of 2.92%, 3.26%, and 2.88% in 
SO2 intensity for personal connections of the mayor, city secretary, or either. The IV estimates in Table 4 are slighter 
larger the ordinary least squares estimates. It should be noted that it is possible that the IV approach is helpful in 
addressing the endogeneity problem and presents a more accurate estimate of the effect of political connections on 
pollution. In addition, it is worth noting that the IV estimations represent the local average treatment effects of an 
instrument-induced shift in patronage connections (Brinch et al., 2017). 
Table 4: Causal Relationship Identification by IV Approach 
 lnSO2 lnSO2 lnSO2 lnSO2 lnSO2 lnSO2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
mayor 0.0292**   0.0292**   
 (0.0136)   (0.0136)   
secretary  0.0237   0.0326**  
  (0.0149)   (0.0152)  
secretaryormayor   0.0210   0.0288** 
   (0.0132)   (0.0134) 
InOutput -0.6213*** -0.6243*** -0.6243*** -0.6213*** -0.6213*** -0.6213*** 
 (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) 
InEmployee 0.3496*** 0.3516*** 0.3516*** 0.3496*** 0.3496*** 0.3496*** 
 (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045) 
open 0.0016*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0016*** 0.0017*** 0.0017*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Export -0.7076*** -0.7281*** -0.7282*** -0.7076*** -0.7074*** -0.7075*** 
 (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0141) 
cons 4.4523*** 4.1101*** 4.1104*** 4.4523*** 4.4503*** 4.4516*** 
 (0.0927) (0.0493) (0.0493) (0.0927) (0.0927) (0.0927) 
City Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes    
Year Yes Yes Yes    
Industry x Year    Yes Yes Yes 
F ristStageF statistic       
N 291394 291394 291394 291394 291394 291394 
adj.R2 0.475 0.471 0.471 0.475 0.475 0.475 
Note: Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. Standard error is 
presented in parentheses. Regressions include city, industry, and year fixed effects in columns 1, 2, and 3, and city, 
industry–year, and year fixed effects in columns 4, 5, and 6. 
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4.3 Robustness Checks 
To verify the reliability of these findings, this study also conducts empirical research on other pollutants. Table 5 
presents the results of robustness checks. The explanatory variables include the intensity of COD, ammonia nitrogen, 
waste gas, and industrial dust, shown in in columns 1 to 4, respectively. The main explanatory variable used in Table 
5 is whether either the city mayor or city secretary has political connections to the provincial governor. The same set 
of control variables as in Table 5 is included in the robustness checks, and city, year, industry–year fixed effects are 
included. When either the city mayor or the city secretary is connected to the provincial governor, the COD, ammonia 
nitrogen, waste gas, and industrial dust (which is the largest among all pollutants) intensities increase by 2.06%, 
3.24%, 2.20%, and 6.26%, respectively. Table 5 shows that the presence of political connections of the city mayor 
or secretary increase the pollution intensity for other kinds of pollutants as well. 
This study uses the presence of personal connections between provincial secretaries and city leaders as the main 
explanatory variable, while the connections between provincial governors and city leaders could also be important. 
As a robustness test, the results for connections between city secretaries or mayors and provincial governors are also 
provided in the appendix as Table A1, which are in line with the above findings. This study also considers the effects 
of city mayors or secretaries having the same university and hometown as provincial secretaries. The results are 
provided in the appendix as Table A2. 
Table 5: Other Pollutant Intensity and Political Connections 
 
 COD Ammonia Nitrogen Gas Dust 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
secretaryormayor 0.0206** 0.0324** 0.0220*** 0.0626*** 
 (0.0092) (0.0155) (0.0069) (0.0085) 
InOutput -0.6489*** -0.6895*** -0.5107*** -0.7270*** 
 (0.0033) (0.0049) (0.0029) (0.0033) 
InEmployee 0.4668*** 0.4653*** 0.3925*** 0.3633*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0071) (0.0041) (0.0048) 
open 0.0043*** 0.0066*** -0.0014*** 0.0006** 
 (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Export -0.1393*** -0.2067*** -0.5255*** -0.6114*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0184) (0.0128) (0.0151) 
cons 1.8331*** -2.1899*** 0.7770*** 4.1619*** 
 (0.1697) (0.3466) (0.0864) (0.1021) 
City Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry xYear Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Y ear Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 308517 142027 334164 270352 
adj.R2 0.397 0.397 0.476 0.479 
Note: Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. Standard error is 
presented in parentheses. All regressions include city, industry–year, and year fixed effects. 
4.4 Heterogeneity 
Our study next explores whether the effect of the personal connections of political elites on pollution intensity is 
heterogeneous among different enterprises. Two main aspects are considered: the type of ownership and the size of 
the firm. 
First, this study tests the heterogeneous effect among firms with different types of ownership. The type of ownership 
is important, especially in China. One reason is that SOEs can be considered as extended arms of the government 
(Yu et al., 2020), and their pollution behavior has a close relationship with political connections. Another reason is 
that ownership determines resource allocation inside firms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), which is highly relevant to 
pollutant intensity. Considering the reality of China, the full sample is divided into three subsamples: domestically 
owned firms, firms owned by Hong Kong, Macao, or Taiwan, and foreign-owned firms. Table 6 presents the 
estimated results for each of these subsamples. Columns 1 to 3 show that political connections still increase 
enterprises’ SO2 intensity significantly among domestically owned firms. The presence of a personal connection of 
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the city mayor, city secretary, or either with a higher-level leader increases the SO2 intensity by 2.55%, 1.95%, and 
3.40%, respectively. Columns 4 to 6 present the results for firms owned by Hong Kong, Macao, or Taiwan capitals; 
these changes are not significant, except when there is a political connection of the city mayor. Columns 7 to 8 
present the results for foreign-owned firms, showing that there is no significant impact of political connections on 
enterprise SO2 intensity among foreign-owned firms. By comparing domestically owned firms and foreign-owned 
firms, we see that political connections of the city mayor or secretary significantly increase pollution intensity 
through their impact on domestic firms. 
Table 6: SO2 Intensity and Political Connections: by Type of Ownership 
 
 Domestic Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan Foreign 
lnS02 lnS02 lnS02 lnS02 lnS02 lnS02 lnS02 lnS02 lnS02 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
mayor 0.0255***   0.0757***   -0.0126   
 (0.0075)   (0.0280)   (0.0307)   
secretary  0.0195**   -0.0263   0.0091  
  (0.0077)   (0.0281)   (0.0324)  
secretaryormayor   0.0340***   0.0399   -0.0323 
   (0.0076)   (0.0275)   (0.0305) 
InOutput -0.5958***-0.5958***-0.6049***-0.5944***-0.5951***-0.6114***-0.7133***-0.7133***-0.7443*** 
 (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0106) (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0106) 
InEmployee 0.3648*** 0.3648*** 0.3723*** 0.1932*** 0.1941*** 0.2234*** 0.3413*** 0.3414*** 0.3742*** 
 (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0047) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0151) (0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0161) 
open -0.0007***-0.0007***-0.0007*** 0.0042** 0.0041** 0.0068*** 0.0083*** 0.0083*** 0.0069*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0020) 
Export -0.5129***-0.5129***-0.4699***-0.7021***-0.7022***-0.6713***-0.5535***-0.5535***-0.4990*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0168) (0.0350) (0.0350) (0.0333) (0.0385) (0.0385) (0.0357) 
cons 4.1818*** 4.1805*** 3.3026*** 5.9122*** 5.9345*** 4.6159*** 4.5096*** 4.4825*** 3.3440*** 
 (0.0938) (0.0938) (0.0997) (0.8691) (0.8832) (0.8587) (0.6962) (0.6951) (0.6293) 
City Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry xYear Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Y ear Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 242859 242859 275899 24581 24581 27641 22730 22730 27452 
adj.R2 0.444 0.444 0.443 0.478 0.478 0.475 0.520 0.520 0.532 
Note: Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. Standard error is 
presented in parentheses. All regressions include city, industry–year, and year fixed effects. 
Second, this study tests the heterogeneous effect among firms of different scales. Medium-sized or small enterprises 
have grown rapidly and are the main contributors to China’s environmental problems (Meng et al., 2018), and should 
be given greater attention in pollution mitigation efforts. In addition, large manufacturing firms often pollute heavily 
and more likely to have close ties to political elites. Table 7 presents the estimated results for the three subsamples. 
Columns 1 to 3 show that the presence of a political connection of the city mayor, city secretary, or either with 
higher-level leaders increases the SO2 intensity of large enterprises by 3.85%, 5.90%, and 6.23%, respectively. 
Columns 4 to 6 show that the presence of a political connection of the city mayor, city secretary, or either increases 
the SO2 intensity of medium-sized enterprises by 7.75%, 3.05%, and 5.64%, respectively. Columns 7 to 9 show that 
the presence of a political connection of the city mayor, city secretary, or either increases the SO2 intensity of small 
enterprises by 3.30%, 1.45%, and 2.58%, respectively. These results provide evidence that political connections 




Table 7: SO2 Intensity and Political Connections: by Enterprise Size 



















mayor 0.0385   0.0775***   0.0330***   
 (0.0305)   (0.0159)   (0.0088)   
secretary  0.0590*   0.0305*   0.0145  
  (0.0320)   (0.0162)   (0.0089)  
secretaryormayor  0.0623**   0.0564***   0.0258*** 
   (0.0299)   (0.0160)   (0.0088) 
lnOutput -0.6205***-0.6203***-0.6207***-0.6781***-0.6782***-0.7025***-0.6471***-0.6470***-0.6612*** 
 (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0134) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0068) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0038) 
lnEmployee 0.5659*** 0.5661*** 0.5705*** 0.3912*** 0.3914*** 0.4092*** 0.3102*** 0.3102*** 0.3207*** 
 (0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0206) (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0124) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0058) 
open 0.0027*** 0.0027*** 0.0047*** 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0022*** -0.0019***-0.0018***-0.0020*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Export -0.4646***-0.4648***-0.4036***-0.5494***-0.5488***-0.5007***-0.6698***-0.6694***-0.6528*** 
 (0.0696) (0.0696) (0.0607) (0.0310) (0.0311) (0.0293) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0167) 
cons 2.6371*** 2.6311*** 2.1486*** 4.9521*** 4.9490*** 4.0206*** 4.6579*** 4.6569*** 3.6496*** 
 (0.3543) (0.3542) (0.3802) (0.1921) (0.1923) (0.2190) (0.1128) (0.1129) (0.1151) 
City Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry xYear Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 17572 17572 22566 61141 61141 70992 172103 172103 195802 
adj.R2 0.561 0.561 0.553 0.496 0.496 0.503 0.443 0.443 0.444 
Note: Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. Standard error is 
presented in parentheses. All regressions include city, industry–year, and year fixed effects. 
This study also tests the heterogeneous effect among different geographical regions and among different sectors, 
which are provided in appendix B as Table B1 and Table B2. 
5. Extension Analysis and Mechanisms 
This study conducts a series of extension analyses to investigate the mechanism behind the high pollution intensity 
related to political connections. First, it checks whether politically connected officials are assigned to more 
productive regions. It then gives evidence of the “pollution for promotion” mechanism by proving the existence of 
the political tournament championship (Li and Zhou, 2005). Finally, it analyzes whether corrupt officials are related 
to higher pollution intensity and investigates how the interaction between political connections and corrupt behavior 
further increases pollution intensity. 
5.1 Favorable Conditions or Test of Ability 
As mentioned in the introduction and literature review, a large body of political economy studies have documented 
how personal connections could bring more resources to clients from their patrons. In China’s “relationship-based 
economy,” resources could be biased towards local officials with political connections (Opper and Brehm, 2007). It 
is possible that connected political elites are related to higher pollution intensity, either because they were designated 
to cities with favorable conditions as a benefit or because they were appointed to more polluting regions as a test of 
their abilities (Jia, 2017). 
In this section, we first examine this mechanism by analyzing the city economic scale in terms of GDP on the year 
and 1 and 2 years before the as the appointment of a city secretary or mayor. If this favorable conditions mechanism 
exists, we would expect that secretaries and mayors with political connections would be appointed to cities with a 
higher GDP. Table 8 shows the results of this mechanism for both secretaries and mayors. In each column, we 
include the population size for the same period with the independent variable, the local official’s educational 
background, the city fixed effect to control for city characteristics, and the year fixed effect to control for common 
growth trends or economic shocks that influence all cities at the same time, such as the global financial crisis of 2008, 
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the Four-trillion Economic Stimulus Plan enacted at the end of 2008. Columns 1 to 3 present the results for city 
secretaries, which show that local officials are appointed to cities with better economic performance if they have 
political connections to the provincial secretary. The city GDP at the starting year and 1 and 2 years before the 
appointment of secretaries with connections is 7.60%, 7.27%, and 10.05% higher than that of cities whose secretaries 
have no personal connections. Columns 4 to 6 show similar results for mayors. The city GDP at the starting year and 
1 and 2 years before the appointment of mayors with connections is 12.47%, 12.24%, and 14.05% higher than that 
of cities whose mayors have no personal connections. 
Table 8: City GDP before Local Officials Take Office 
 
 Secretary Mayor 
Take Office One Year Two Years Take Office One Year Two Years 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Inpop 0.3990*** 0.3854*** 0.8104*** 0.1643*** 0.3812*** 0.8778*** 
 (0.0494) (0.0739) (0.1626) (0.0364) (0.0584) (0.1595) 
secretary 0.0760*** 0.0727*** 0.1005***    
 (0.0093) (0.0098) (0.0109)    
education 0.0066 -0.0081 -0.0249**    
 (0.0091) (0.0098) (0.0116)    
mayor    0.1247*** 0.1224*** 0.1405*** 
    (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0080) 
education    0.0125 -0.0007 0.0086 
    (0.0083) (0.0088) (0.0089) 
cons 13.2297*** 13.4111*** 10.4960*** 14.8527*** 13.4871*** 10.0487*** 
 
(0.3459) (0.5125) (1.1055) (0.2540) (0.4027) (1.0916) 
City Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Y ear Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 4155 3755 3463 4080 3781 3494 
adj.R2 0.955 0.954 0.940 0.932 0.962 0.966 
Note: Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. Standard error is 
presented in parentheses. All regressions include city and year fixed effects. The variable 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 refers to the log of 
the city population at the starting year and 1 and 2 years before the appointment of secretaries (columns 1 to 3) and 
mayors (columns 4 to 6). 
We next further rule out the possibility that local officials are appointed to more polluting regions as a challenge to 
test their abilities. We compare the pollution intensity of SO2, waste-water, and smoke at the starting year and 1 and 
2 years before the appointment of local officials with and without patronage connections. The results for the presence 
of political connections of the city mayor, secretary, or either, shown in Table 9, indicate that connected officials are 
assigned to less polluting regions when the city GDP and population have been controlled, notwithstanding that the 
coefficients are not all significant. Comparing the results shown in Table 8 and those in Table 9, we see that 
politically connected officials are assigned to more productive regions with more favorable conditions as a benefit 
rather than more polluting regions as a challenge. 
Table 9: City Pollution before Local Officials Take Office 
 













Panel A: SO2 Emissions      
Ingdp 0.0471 0.1367*** 0.0520 -0.1059** -0.0309 0.1012** 
 (0.0438) (0.0465) (0.0523) (0.0495) (0.0450) (0.0507) 
Inpop 0.0455 -0.4179* -0.4826* 0.2416 -0.2298 -0.3768 
 (0.2758) (0.2299) (0.2855) (0.1818) (0.1471) (0.3104) 
connection -0.0869*** -0.0930*** -0.0476* -0.0782*** -0.0458** -0.0730*** 
 
(0.0254) (0.0250) (0.0265) (0.0215) (0.0191) (0.0215) 
Panel B: Waste Water      
Ingdp 0.0675* -0.0310 0.0106 -0.0510 -0.0211 0.0486 
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 (0.0369) (0.0355) (0.0431) (0.0428) (0.0428) (0.0422) 
Inpop 0.3223* 0.4681*** 0.9347*** 0.5297*** 0.3024*** 0.9534*** 
 (0.1957) (0.1311) (0.1887) (0.1527) (0.0978) (0.1915) 
connection -0.0390** -0.0133 -0.0244 -0.0267 0.0015 -0.0119 
 
(0.0193) (0.0199) (0.0196) (0.0181) (0.0188) (0.0164) 
Panel C: Smoke      
Ingdp 0.2121*** 0.2315*** 0.2041*** 0.0800 0.1540*** 0.1286** 
 (0.0540) (0.0526) (0.0640) (0.0637) (0.0582) (0.0610) 
Inpop 0.5082* 0.3859 0.7659* 0.8083*** 0.7094*** 1.3382*** 
 (0.3079) (0.2378) (0.4044) (0.2831) (0.1655) (0.4313) 
connection -0.0299 -0.0618** -0.0600** -0.1015*** -0.0727*** -0.0588** 
 
(0.0295) (0.0298) (0.0291) (0.0285) (0.0244) (0.0248) 
Note: Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. Standard error is 
presented in parentheses. All regressions include whether local secretaries or mayors concerned have a bachelor 
degree or higher, as well as city and year fixed effects as control variables. Regressions that control the city GDP 
per capita instead of the city GDP also show similar results. 
5.2Career Incentive 
One mechanism behind the high pollution intensity could be so-called “pollute for promotion” incentives (Kahn, Li 
and Zhao, 2015; Jia, 2017). The promotion system in China is designed to evaluate and promote the city mayors and 
secretaries who have performed better in fulfilling the targets of the central government. The targets are usually 
economic growth (Li and Zhou, 2005), revenue collection (Shih, Adolph, and Liu, 2012), or, since the 11th Five 
Year Plan from 2006, environmental performance (State, 2006). In this context, targets of city mayors and secretaries 
should be in line with those of upper-level governments. 
Until the 11th Five Year Plan (2006-2010), neither China’s central government nor local officials prioritized 
environmental protection (Zheng et al., 2014), and it was a common to seek economic growth at the cost of the local 
environment (Yu et al., 2020). The mitigation target of reducing SO2 emissions by 10% was not met during the 10th 
Five Year Plan (2001-2005), but was exceeded during the 11th Five Year Plan. Before 2006, politically connected 
city mayors and secretaries were more likely to allow polluting enterprises to create jobs and promote economic 
growth in order to stand out in the political tournament championship (Li and Zhou, 2005; Jia, 2017). However, with 
the 11th Five Year Plan in 2006, the State Council proposed making environmental protection part of the evaluation 
of local governors and regarded it as an assessment criteria for governors selection, appointment, rewards, and 
punishments (State Council, 2006; Pu and Fu, 2018). Since then, environmental performance has become an 
important aspect in central government evaluations of local officials. Since 2006, city mayors and secretaries have 
taken environmental performance into consideration in order to avoid punishment and gain rewards (Pu and Fu, 
2018). 
This study examines this promotion incentive mechanism by designing an empirical strategy similar to the DID 
method. The treatment group includes enterprises in cities with a city mayor or secretary connected to provincial 
governors, while the control group includes those without. The treatment time is defined as the year 2006, since this 
was the year that environmental performance was included as an important criterion in the promotion of local 
officials. The treatment time dummy after 2006 takes 1 after year 2006 (including the year 2006), and 0 otherwise. 
Interactions between the political connection dummy and the treatment time dummy are used to determine the 
difference before and after the change of promotion criterion in the tournament championship. Table 10 presents the 
results, in which columns 1 to 3 provide the basic estimations and columns 4 to 6 further control for firm sizes. The 
coefficients for political connection are significant and positive, which indicates that political connections increase 
SO2 intensity on average. The coefficients of after 2006 are negative, ranging from −1.637 to −0.997. This indicates 
that the SO2 intensity has fallen by 63.1% to 80.5% after 2006, when environmental protection and pollution control 
became an important aspect in the tournament championship. The estimated coefficients of the DID estimator are 
significantly negative. Columns 1, 2, and 3 show that enterprises in cities with politically connected mayors or 
secretaries have reduced their SO2 intensity more than those without, by 4.57%, 4.80%, and 3.03%, respectively. 
The negative DID estimators reflect how city mayors and secretaries have transferred their efforts from being focused 
solely on economic growth to also include environmental performance after the change of promotion criterion. 
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The results show that both the intensive SO2 pollution and its rapid abatement since the 11th Five Year Plan can be 
explained by the career incentive. Pollution intensity has largely changed after the change of promotion criterion. 
Although previous studies have found solid evidence of pollution for economic growth, this study shows that the 
career incentive is greater than pollution for promotion. By using a large sample of recent data prior to 2012, which 
include enough observations after the change of promotion criterion, this study reveals that local officials 
accommodate their environmental regulations and performance to “stand in the boss’s shoes” (Maskin et al., 1997). 
This section also shows that connected local officials are more likely to conform to the latest promotion criterion. 
The results reiterate the findings of previous studies, which found that informal institutions could work as an effective 
tool to align the targets of central and local governments, rather than always functioning as impediments to the formal 
institutions (Jiang, 2018). 
Table 10: SO2 Intensity, Political connection and the Change of Promotion Criterion 
 
 lnSO2 lnSO2 lnSO2 lnSO2 lnSO2 lnSO2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
mayor 0.0547***   0.0596***   
 (0.0098)   (0.0092)   
secretary  0.0621***   0.0510***  
  (0.0098)   (0.0092)  
secretaryormayor   0.0252**   0.0285*** 
   (0.0099)   (0.0092) 
after2006 -1.3652*** -1.3653*** -1.6374*** -0.9972*** -1.0022*** -1.2666*** 
 (0.0971) (0.0971) (0.0989) (0.0947) (0.0946) (0.0993) 
mayor xafter2006 -0.0457***   -0.0606***   
 (0.0130)   (0.0120)   
secretary xafter2006  -0.0480***   -0.0567***  
  (0.0131)   (0.0121)  
mayororsecretary xafter2006   0.0303**   0.0086 
   (0.0129)   (0.0118) 
InOutput    -0.4781*** -0.4780*** -0.4887*** 
    (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0020) 
cons 2.2425*** 2.2431*** 0.9628*** 5.9051*** 5.9075*** 4.7683*** 
 
(0.0918) (0.0918) (0.0960) (0.0925) (0.0924) (0.0986) 
City Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry xYear Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 392899 392899 439327 392899 392899 439327 
adj.R 0.337 0.337 0.345 0.442 0.442 0.449 
Note: Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. Standard error is 
presented in parentheses. All regressions include city and industry–year fixed effects.  
To examine the effects of patronage connections for each year, we included interaction terms between the patronage 
connection dummy and dummies for each year, in which 2006 is not included as a benchmark. Observations from 
2001 to 2011 are selected to include samples from 5 years before until 5 years after the changes to promotion criteria 
in 2006. In this regression, we also include the city trend and industry trend fixed effects and year fixed effects. The 
regression model used is as follows: 
ln𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟
5
𝑟𝑟=−5
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 + 𝜆𝜆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Here, 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟  is the interaction of the year dummy and the connection dummy. The value of 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟  is 1 for observations with 
connections when considering the 𝑚𝑚-th year before the change of promotion criterion (if 𝑚𝑚 < 0) or the 𝑚𝑚-th year after 
the change of promotion criterion (if 𝑚𝑚 > 0), and 0 otherwise. In this study, connections of both mayors and city 
secretary are considered, and the results are shown in Figures 3. Figure 3(a) shows the effect of personal connections 
of city secretary and Figure 3(b) shows that of personal connections of mayor. The results show that before 2006, 
when environmental protection began to be considered critical in the promotion of political officials, patronage 
connections tend to further increase pollution intensity, while after 2006, patronage connections tended to reduce 
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pollution intensity compared with the benchmark year of 2006. The results shown in section 4 show that while 
political connections do increase SO2 intensity on average, this is only part of the story. Figure 3 further reveals that 
patronage connections largely increase SO2 intensity when economic growth was the sole target of upper-level 
officials and the most important criteria in their promotion, while connections contribute to the mitigation of SO2 
when environmental protection was considered as a promotion criteria. 
    
(a)        (b) 
Figure 3: Coefficients of Political Connections in Each Year 
5.3Corruptive Pollution 
Another possible mechanism of high SO2 intensity is pollution resulting from corruption (Zhou, Wang and Chen, 
2020). As many prior studies have pointed out, politically connected local officials are more likely to become corrupt 
since they not only have better access to resources but also are less likely to be punished even if they are exposed 
due to patronage protections. In Table 11, corrupt behavior is used as the main explanatory variable, which takes the 
value 1 if officials have been found to conduct any corrupt behavior during their political career and 0 otherwise. 
Columns 1 to 3 use the corrupt behavior of local officials as the main explanatory variable, and the results show that 
enterprises in cities with corrupt mayors or secretaries have higher SO2 intensity than those without. Columns 4 to 
6 include political connections of officials and the interaction terms between political connections and corrupt 
behavior. Corrupt behavior by city mayors significantly increases enterprise SO2 levels. Meanwhile the interaction 
term for corrupt behavior of city secretaries is not significant. There is a positive correlation with political 
connections, as shown in columns 4 to 6 of Table 11, which agrees with the results shown in Table 2. The interaction 
term of corrupt behavior by mayors and political connections, shown in column 4, is not significant, while corrupt 
behavior by secretaries, shown in column 5, significantly increases enterprise SO2 intensity by 5.32%. The results 
in column 6 also show that if either the city mayor or the secretary is corrupt and connected, enterprises in the city 
would also have higher SO2 intensity. These results show that corruption or political connections of local officials 
are both related to higher firm SO2 intensity, and that SO2 intensity will further increase if local officials are both 
connected and corrupt. This indicates that corrupt political elites with patronage connections would allow more 
pollution since their patronage protections shield them and their career from repercussions (Jia, 2017). 
Table 11: SO2 Intensity and the Corrupted Political Elites 
 
 lnSO2 lnSO2 lnSO2 lnSO2 lnSO2 lnSO2 




0.0451*** 0.0485***   
 (0.0129) (0.0173)   
secretarycrime 0.0059  -0.0124  
 (0.0119)  (0.0148)  
secretaryormayorcrime 0.0279***   -0.0007 
 (0.0099)   (0.0134) 
mayor  0.0207***   
  (0.0077)   
secretary   0.0098 
(0.0078) 
 




mayorcrime x mayor  -0.0075 
(0.0227) 
  
secretarycrime x secretary   0.0532** 
(0.0218) 
 
secretaryormayorcrime x secretaryormayor    0.0589*** 




0.6209*** -0.6218*** -0.6395*** -0.6209*** -0.6218*** -0.6395*** 




0.3483*** 0.3475*** 0.3634*** 0.3482*** 0.3475*** 0.3634*** 
 (0.0046) (0.0045) (0.0043) (0.0046) (0.0045) (0.0043) 
open 0.0016*** 0.0016*** 0.0021*** 0.0016*** 0.0016*** 0.0021*** 




0.7037*** -0.7094*** -0.6815*** -0.7036*** -0.7094*** -0.6813*** 
 (0.0145) (0.0143) (0.0134) (0.0145) (0.0143) (0.0134) 
cons 4.3642*** 4.4977*** 3.3766*** 4.3643*** 4.4962*** 3.3883*** 
 
(0.0994) (0.1012) (0.0989) (0.0994) (0.1011) (0.0991) 
N 278416 283137 332286 278416 283137 332286 
adj.R2 0.474 0.474 0.479 0.474 0.474 0.480 
Note: Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. Standard error is 
presented in parentheses. All regressions include city and industry–year fixed effects. 
6. Conclusion and Discussion 
The air pollution that has accompanied China’s rapid development has called for both public attention and 
government mitigation efforts. Based on a unique data set of firm-level pollution paired with a database of political 
elites, this study investigates the political roots behind China’s abnormally high levels of pollution and subsequent 
mitigation efforts. This can help us to better understand how the personal connections of political elites influence 
local air pollution intensity in China based on firm-level evidence. We have presented three main sets of results. 
First, we show that local officials who have personal ties to the leader of a province tend to have more SO2-intensive 
enterprises under their governance. This finding is further substantiated by identifying the causal relationship 
between political connection and higher pollution, as firms newly opened under the governance of secretaries or 
mayors with personal connections are more polluting than those under local leaders without such connections. We 
also use the tenure of provincial secretaries as an IV of political connections, which helps us further identify the 
causality between air pollution and personal connections of political elites. This study conducts additional robustness 
tests on several other metrics and pollutants, including COD, ammonia nitrogen, waste gas, and industrial dust, which 
show similar results as SO2 in the baseline analysis. 
Second, we conduct heterogeneity tests for different ownership and firm sizes. The results show that political 
connections significantly increase the pollution intensity among domestically owned firms as compared with foreign-
owned firms. The results also show that political connections increase pollution intensity for large, medium, and 
small firms. 
Third, this study conducts a number of extension analyses to investigate the mechanisms behind Chinese pollution 
governance and performance, including reasons for appointment of local leaders to a given city (i.e., to cities with 
favorable conditions as a reward rather than to polluting cites as a test of ability), career incentives, and pollution 
resulting from corruption. We give statistical evidence that politically connected officials are assigned to more 
productive cities with more favorable conditions, and we rule out the possibility that they have been appointed to 
more polluted regions as a test of ability. We show that career incentives are a reason behind high pollution (prior to 
2006) and its mitigation (after 2006) using an empirical strategy similar to the DID method, finding that local officials 
have transferred their targets from polluting growth to environmental protection after the changes in promotion 
criteria. We also find that enterprises in cities with corrupt mayors or secretaries have higher SO2 intensity than 
those without, that air pollution is further exacerbated if corrupted officials have patronage connections. 
The findings of this study shed light on the political roots of China’s pollution and highlight the role of political 
institutions in environmental management and pollution mitigation. One implication of our findings is that the 
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personal connections of political elites encourage more pollution through favorable resources and political protection 
from their patrons, which should be addressed through methods such as central government administrative inquiry, 
political turnover, or public monitoring. Another implication is that a more inclusive set of promotion criteria are 
necessary, such that local officials will pay more attention to environmental issues rather than prioritize economic 
growth at all costs. The results show that the role of personal connections between political elites can be different at 
different stages, which transcends the traditional “pollution for promotion” idea. Patronage connections encourage 
bold pollution behavior when economic growth is the sole target of higher level government, and encourage harder 
work in pollution mitigation when green development and environmental protection is prioritized by patrons. 
Personal connections “grease the wheels” and help upper- and lower-level officials align their targets through 
informal institutions. 
This is certainly only part of the story, considering the recent mass transition of polluting industries and factories 
between cities and provinces, including both the relocation of polluted industries and the reallocation and outsourcing 
of polluted intermediate products. Future research should dig deeper into how formal and informal political 
institutions influence the outsourcing of highly polluting products and help us better understand the pollution haven 
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Appendix A. Robustness Checks for SO2 Intensity and Political Connections 
In Table 2 we present the baseline results on the effect of political connections on enterprise SO2 
intensity. In Table A1 we additionally present the results between city secretaries or mayors and 
provincial governors. 
Table A1: SO2 Intensity and Political Connections: Province Governors 
 lnSO2 lnSO2 lnSO2 lnSO2 lnSO2 lnSO2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
mayor 0.0227***   0.0276***   
 (0.0072)   (0.0073)   
secretary  0.0412***   0.0456***  
  (0.0090)   (0.0091)  
mayororsecretary   0.0510***   0.0574*** 
   (0.0072)   (0.0072) 
InOutput -0.6243*** -0.6243*** -0.6431*** -0.6214*** -0.6213*** -0.6395*** 
 (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0030) 
InEmployee 0.3517*** 0.3517*** 0.3661*** 0.3496*** 0.3497*** 0.3635*** 
 (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0043) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0043) 
open 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0024*** 0.0017*** 0.0016*** 0.0021*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
export -0.7283*** -0.7281*** -0.7068*** -0.7078*** -0.7075*** -0.6819*** 
 (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0134) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0134) 
cons 4.1150*** 4.1107*** 3.0306*** 4.4551*** 4.4493*** 3.3960*** 
 
(0.0493) (0.0493) (0.0488) (0.0928) (0.0928) (0.0989) 
City Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes    
Y ear Yes Yes Yes    
Industry x Year    Yes Yes Yes 
N 291394 291394 332286 291394 291394 332286 
adj.R2 0.471 0.471 0.475 0.475 0.475 0.480 
Note: The significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
Regressions include city, industry and year fixed effects in columns 1, 2, and 3, and include city, industry-year, and year fixed effects in columns 
4, 5, and 6. 
Note: Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. Standard 
error is are presented in parentheses. Regressions include city, industry, and year fixed effects in 
columns 1, 2, and 3, and city, industry–year, and year fixed effects in columns 4, 5, and 6. 
This study also considers other types of connections, namely, local leaders having the same university 
and hometown as higher-level officials. The results are provided in the appendix as Table A2. 
Table A2: SO2 Intensity and Political Connections: Education and Hometown 
 Education Experience Hometown 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
secretary 0.1027***  0.1070***  -0.0771**  -0.0830***  
 (0.0237)  (0.0237)  (0.0307)  (0.0309)  
mayor  0.0470  0.0530  -0.1295***  -0.1233*** 
  (0.0322)  (0.0323)  (0.0464)  (0.0463) 
InOutput -0.6227***-0.6226***-0.6211***-0.6211***-0.6226***-0.6226***-0.6211***-0.6211*** 
 (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) 
InEmployee 0.3201*** 0.3201*** 0.3179*** 0.3179*** 0.3200*** 0.3200*** 0.3178*** 0.3179*** 
 (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052) 
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open 0.0024*** 0.0024*** 0.0023*** 0.0023*** 0.0024*** 0.0024*** 0.0023*** 0.0023*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Export -0.7862***-0.7860***-0.7708***-0.7707***-0.7855***-0.7858***-0.7702***-0.7705*** 
 (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0167) 
cons 4.2333*** 4.2428*** 4.7117*** 4.7223*** 4.2411*** 4.2419*** 4.7208*** 4.7207*** 
 (0.0631) (0.0630) (0.1716) (0.1716) (0.0630) (0.0630) (0.1717) (0.1717) 
N 212649 212649 212649 212649 212649 212649 212649 212649 
adj. R2 0.479 0.479 0.482 0.482 0.479 0.479 0.482 0.482 
Note: Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. Standard 
error is presented in parentheses. Regressions include city, industry, and year fixed effects in columns 
1 to 4, and city, industry–year, and year fixed effects in columns 5 to 8. 
Appendix B. Heterogeneity Tests for SO2 Intensity and Political Connections 
There are large geographic and demographic differences across China. For instance, east and coastal 
provinces are more developed regions, while west and inland provinces are developing regions. This 
study separates the full sample into three groups: eastern provinces including Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, 
Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, and Hainan; middle provinces including 
Shanxi, Neimenggu, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, and Guangxi; and 
western provinces including Sichuan, Chongqing, Guizhou, Yunnan, Xizang, Shannxi, Gansu, Ningxia, 
Qinghai, and Xinjiang. The results in Table 8 show that patronage connections of local leaders in eastern 
and middle provinces increase SO2 intensity under their governance, while the effects in western 
provinces are not statistically significant. 
Table B1: SO2 Intensity and Political Connections: by Geographical Regions 
 Eastern Provinces Middle Provinces Western Provinces 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
mayor 0.0265***   0.0425***   -0.0052   
 (0.0096)   (0.0130)   (0.0220)   
secretary  0.0227**   0.0151   0.0193  
  (0.0099)   (0.0136)   (0.0219)  
mayororsecretary   0.0281***   0.0441***   0.0171 
   (0.0100)   (0.0131)   (0.0225) 
InOutput -0.6148***-0.6148***-0.6148***-0.6092***-0.6091***-0.6091***-0.6686***-0.6687***-
  (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0092) 
InEmployee 0.2634*** 0.2635*** 0.2635*** 0.4417*** 0.4417*** 0.4416*** 0.4970*** 0.4970*** 
  (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0131) 




-0.0011** 0.0038*** 0.0038*** 








  (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0362) (0.0362) (0.0362) (0.0735) (0.0735) (0.0735) 
cons 5.2422*** 5.2420*** 5.2412*** 3.5198*** 3.5252*** 3.5188*** 3.3382*** 3.3299*** 
  (0.1992) (0.1991) (0.1991) (0.1231) (0.1234) (0.1230) (0.1911) (0.1908) (0.1913) 
N 166349 166349 166349 81925 81925 81925 43120 43120 43120 
adj.R2 0.488 0.488 0.488 0.464 0.464 0.464 0.444 0.444 0.444 
Note: Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. Standard 
error is presented in parentheses. All regressions include city, industry–year, and year fixed effects. 
There is also heterogeneity between different sectors. This study separates the full sample into three 




Table B2: SO2 Intensity and Political Connections: by Sectors 
 Mining Manufacturing Electricity, Water and Heat 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
mayor 0.0345   0.0258***   -0.0746*   
 (0.0379)   (0.0073)   (0.0412)   
secretary  -0.0169   0.0196***   0.0039  
  (0.0385)   (0.0075)   (0.0391)  
mayororsecretary  0.0007   0.0322***   -0.0196 
   (0.0387)   (0.0074)   (0.0416) 
InOutput -0.6316***-0.6315***-0.6128***-0.6276***-0.6276***-0.6474***-0.3382***-0.3383***-
  (0.0188) (0.0188) (0.0182) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0191) (0.0191) (0.0180) 
InEmployee 0.4266*** 0.4268*** 0.4293*** 0.3442*** 0.3442*** 0.3592*** 0.3030*** 0.3027*** 
  (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0215) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0045) (0.0297) (0.0297) (0.0286) 
open 0.0046*** 0.0046*** 0.0044*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 
 
-0.0028 -0.0027 -0.0026 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0018) 
export -0.0184 -0.0193 0.0842 -0.7031***-0.7031***-
 
-2.4691 -2.4666 -1.8762 
 (0.3353) (0.3356) (0.2993) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0134) (1.6095) (1.6119) (1.4347) 
cons 4.6920*** 
 
1.4597*** 4.6769*** 4.6750*** 3.5868*** 5.9361*** 5.9463*** 
  (0.5256) (0.5259) (0.3256) (0.0639) (0.0639) (0.0654) (0.3148) (0.3148) (0.2179) 
N 10663 10663 11904 273109 273109 311725 7622 7622 8657 
adj.R2 0.429 0.429 0.416 0.459 0.459 0.465 0.388 0.388 0.389 
Note: Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. Standard 
error is presented in parentheses. All regressions include city, industry–year, and year fixed effects. 
